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INTRODUCTION 
The robots will not be pleased with Frank Pasquale.  In New Laws 
of Robotics, the Brooklyn Law professor outlines two possible futures that 
can emerge from a growing conflict between human and robotic thought.  
The first is a future of robotic dominance.  In that future, decisions 
traditionally made by human professionals (e.g., who goes to jail, what 
medicines are prescribed, and what news gets published) are decided by 
robots powered by artificially intelligent algorithms.  The second future 
offers robots a less-favored role in the ordering of human affairs.  Pasquale 
earns the displeasure of our would-be robotic overlords by outlining the 
path to this second future, where human professional judgment is 
enhanced by (but not replaced with) robotic systems.  
The second future may seem too obvious a preference to merit a 
book-length discussion.  Humans, after all, might be presumed to 
instinctively work towards a future where human thought prevails.  But as 
Pasquale observes, economics make the first future appear attractive—at 
least in the short term (p. 172).1  Robots have no need for vacation days, 
lunch breaks, or even sleep.  Robots do not call in sick, nor do they ask for 
pay raises.  Given as much, companies will increasingly have short-term 
incentives to replace costly human labor with less costly robotic systems.  
Cash-strapped governments face a similar calculus, too.  It may one day 
be cheaper, for example, for governments to reimburse a fleet of robotic 
caregivers than a team of human nurses.   
Of course, succumbing to the short-term incentives afforded by 
automation can lead to disastrous societal effects in the long run.  
Companies may find it difficult to sell their widgets if would-be consumers 
have been forced out of work on a widespread basis (pp. 188–89).  And 
governments might find their fiscs emptier yet if citizens with taxable 
wages are replaced by tax-deductible machines (p. 26).2  Thankfully, 
 
† The views expressed in this Review are mine alone, and should not be attributed 
to my employer.  I would like to thank Frank Pasquale, Matthew P. Sappington, 
and the editors of the Duke Law & Technology Review for helpful feedback on 
earlier drafts of this Review. 
1 All in-text citations in this Review are citations to New Laws of Robotics.  
2 See also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 426–27 (2017) (“Robots do not pay taxes. . . . 
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humans have developed a system (i.e., political governance) capable of 
producing outcomes (i.e., laws) that can alter short-term incentives to 
advance society’s long-term goals.  
Thus enters Pasquale’s four new laws of robotics.3  Collectively 
his laws aim to structure how human professionals incorporate artificially 
intelligent robots into their workplaces (pp. 3, 12–13).  The goal is to 
ensure that professional judgment is exercised by disperse sets of humans 
with localized knowledge, not robots powered by algorithms that are 
centrally developed and controlled (pp. 4, 178).  Pasquale’s four new laws 
of robotics provide as follows: 
1. Robotic systems and artificial intelligence (“AI”) 
should complement professionals, not replace them 
(p. 3); 
2. Robotic systems and AI should not counterfeit 
humanity (p. 7); 
3. Robotic systems and AI should not intensify zero-
sum arms races (p. 9); and 
4. Robotic systems and AI must always indicate the 
identity of their creators, controllers, and owners (p. 
11).   
Pasquale applies these four laws in dozens of case studies.  Each 
case study illustrates the harms his laws are intended to prevent—i.e., the 
harms associated with centralizing professional judgment in the small 
group of roboticists and computer scientists responsible for developing 
and controlling advanced decision-making algorithms.  
The education industry offers one such case study.  In the near 
future, teachers may be required to cede decision-making authority to 
algorithms capable of running hyper-efficient classrooms (p. 176).  By 
reviewing classroom video from all over the world, a centralized algorithm 
could analyze student behavior (such as puzzled looks and questions) to 
craft the perfect lecture (pp. 60, 75).  One can imagine the benefits of 
utilizing such an algorithm to improve educational outcomes—
particularly for students who might not otherwise have access to premiere 
 
[P]olicymakers will have to figure out how to keep the lights on in the absence of 
. . . income taxes.”).   
3 Pasquale’s “new laws” are a play on the three laws of robotics proposed in 1942 
by science fiction writer Isaac Asimov (p. 2).  In short, Asimov’s three laws 
provide: (1) a robot may not injure a human; (2) a robot must obey a human’s 
order, unless it conflicts with the first law; and (3) a robot must protect its own 
existence, unless it conflicts with the first or second law.  ISAAC ASIMOV, 
Runaround, in I, ROBOT 41, 53 (1950). 
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educators.  But harnessing those benefits requires subjecting students to 
increased surveillance.  And students, cognizant of such surveillance, 
might change their behavior in unhelpful ways—failing to ask clarifying 
questions or express confusion, less the algorithm label them “problem 
kid[s]” unfit for certain colleges or occupations (p. 74).  Further, 
centralized algorithms might fail to appreciate peculiarities for which 
human teachers readily account.  Where an algorithm might schedule an 
afternoon multiplication lesson, a human teacher might recognize the need 
to reschedule the lesson when unseasonably warm weather makes it 
difficult for fidgety students to concentrate (p. 6).  
Pasquale’s book is critical reading for those interested in 
addressing the harms and benefits of the coming algorithmic age.4  But if 
there is a critique to be made, it is that Pasquale offers little detail as to 
who is to enforce his new laws of robotics.  Moreover, when he does offer 
detail, he appears to rely too heavily on federal regulators.5  In suggesting, 
for example, that his laws be enforced by “independent agencies,” such as 
those created in “the New Deal,”6 the book does not fully account for the 
critical role state governments play in shaping workplaces and 
professional responsibilities.  
In this Review, I argue that while New Laws of Robotics 
presciently outlines the harms associated with centralizing professional 
decision-making authority, it remains silent (at best) as to the harms 
associated with centralizing governmental decision-making authority.  
This is notable because the two categories of harms share much in 
common.   
Like how centralizing professional judgment can create an 
unacceptable “mental monoculture” (p. 178), so too can centralizing 
governmental authority.  Notable efforts (such as Pasquale’s) to prevent 
the centralization of professional judgment should be careful to avoid an 
unnecessary centralization of governmental authority.  Any success in 
maintaining a world of disperse sources of professional knowledge will be 
short-lived if it comes at the cost of policing professionals with single sets 
of requirements established by the federal government.    
 
4 See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017) (referring to a coming “society organized around social 
and economic decision-making by algorithms, robots, and [artificially intelligent] 
agents, who not only make the decisions but also, in some cases, carry them out”). 
5 See infra Part I.B. 
6 Eric Allen Been, Asimov’s Three Laws Helped Shape A.I. and Robotics. We 
Need Four More, ONEZERO (Nov. 17, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/its-
time-to-add-4-new-laws-of-robotics-8791139cdb11 (interview with Frank 
Pasquale discussing The New Laws of Robotics).  
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I. TWO CATEGORIES OF HARMS 
In Part I of this Review, I address two categories of harms.  First 
is the category attributable to a centralization of professional decision-
making authority.  Second is the category attributable to a centralization 
of governmental decision-making authority.   
Pasquale dutifully describes the first category, which can arise 
when professional decision-making authority is shifted from disperse sets 
of human professionals to algorithms that are centrally developed and 
controlled.  But Pasquale does not account for the second category of 
harm, which can arise when governmental decision-making authority is 
shifted from state governments to the centralized federal government.  In 
failing to address the harms associated with centralized governmental 
authority, Pasquale risks undermining his arguments regarding the harms 
associated with centralized professional authority.   
A. Centralized Professional Decision-Making Authority 
Pasquale frames his discussion of the harms associated with a 
future of centralized robotic decision-making by outlining the economic 
incentives that might bring such a future into fruition.7  In “[f]ield after 
field,” employers face a temptation to replace costly human workers with 
relatively cheaper robots (p. 26).  Replacing human labor can provide 
some benefits—namely, cheaper services (id.).  “If I can replace my 
dermatologist with an app and my children’s teachers with interactive 
toys,” Pasquale writes, “I have more money to spend on other things” (id.).  
And “[t]he same goes for public services; a town with robot police officers 
or a nation with drone soldiers may pay less taxes to support their wages 
and health care” (id.). 
But those benefits come with costs.  For one, “doctors, teachers, 
soldiers, and police are all potential purchasers of what others have to sell.  
And the less money that they have, the less money I can charge them” 
(id.).  When policymakers consider these economic factors in the 
aggregate, “mass unemployment” can become a major concern (p. 2).  
Aiming to balance the potential costs and benefits of cheap robotic labor, 
Pasquale offers a middle path: Some (but not all) jobs should be saved 
from automation (p. 4).  His argument focuses on the “professions,” which 
he contends should be reserved for humans.   
The vast amount of literature covered by Pasquale makes a clear 
 
7 In highlighting these economic incentives, Pasquale builds off of his earlier 
work.  See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1917 [hereinafter Data-Informed] (describing incentives 
“to substitute [AI] and robotics for human labor”).  
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definition of “profession” unavailable.8  He does offer a working definition 
of the term, which is “capacious, and . . . include[s] many unionized 
workers” (p. 5).  Pasquale’s broad definition of “profession” thus includes 
traditional professionals—such as lawyers, doctors, and engineers—as 
well as new classes of professionals, each capable of “preserv[ing] certain 
human values in health, education, journalism, policing, and many other 
fields” (pp. 22, 171).  Readers are left with the impression that, at bottom, 
determining whether a particular occupation qualifies as a “profession” 
requires determining whether the occupation amounts to a “fulfilling 
vocation[]” (p. 4).   
For Pasquale, human professionals are worth preserving from 
automation because they “alleviat[e] classic tensions between technocracy 
and popular rule” (id.).  “The bargain at the core of professionalism,” he 
writes, “is to empower workers to have some say in the organization of 
production, while imposing duties upon them to advance the common 
good” (id.).  Thus, “local professionals” help promote important societal 
benefits (p. 25).  Throughout the book, Pasquale expresses his concern that 
the societal benefits he attributes to human professionals may be 
undermined should professional decision-making authority come to be 
exercised by centralized algorithms.   
The fundamental problem with professional automation, from 
Pasquale’s perspective, is that algorithms seek to simplify complicated 
professional judgments that are unfit for simplification (pp. 23–24).  
“There is too much uncertainty in ordinary medical practice,” for example, 
“to reduce it all to algorithms, which are commonly derided as ‘cookbook 
medicine’” (p. 25).  It would be better, he argues, to have different doctors 
exercise independent professional judgments informed by growing 
professional consensus (pp. 25, 44).  More broadly, Pasquale expresses his 
concern that, when attempting to replicate and automate human 
professional judgment, “there is a temptation to simply set forth 
quantifiable metrics of success . . . and to optimize algorithms to meet 
them” (p. 28).  This presents a problem because “the definition of what 
counts as success or failure in [professional] fields is highly contestable” 
(id.).9   
 
8 This is in part a consequence of the book’s “balanced stance,” which Pasquale 
recognizes “will disappoint both technophiles and technophobes” (p. 4).  The 
difficulty readers have in categorizing the book’s arguments as falling entirely on 
any one side of any one debate is part of what makes the book such an enjoyable 
read. 
9 One example of a badly identified “success” involves identifying “successful” 
medical patients using data suggesting “poorer patients do worse after organ 
transplantation.”  Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1923.  Such patients’ relative 
lack of success may be a result of income-related difficulties, not anything 
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Given the contested nature of defining successes and failures in 
professional fields, automation risks giving roboticists and computer 
scientists undue influence over some of society’s most important 
decisions. In seeking to replicate complicated professional judgments in 
computer code, roboticists and computer scientists can define successes 
and failures pursuant to their own biases and motives.   
Poorly replicating professional judgment in computer code can cut 
short important professional disagreements that might otherwise crystalize 
into professional consensus.10  There may be a need, then, to avoid 
favoring the biases and motives of the relatively small number of 
roboticists and computer scientists charged with replicating the 
professional judgments of a larger class of varied professionals.  Pasquale 
proposes fulfilling that potential need by placing human professionals “at 
the point of contact of AI—to meditate its effects, assure good data 
collection, report errors, and do other vital work” (p. 28).   
Pasquale’s efforts to keep human professionals “in the loop” are 
intended to bring about a future where “doctors, nurses, teachers, home 
health aides, journalists, and others . . . work with roboticists and computer 
scientists, rather than meekly serving as data sources for their future 
replacements” (pp. 2, 213).  He would prefer a future of “distributed 
expertise,” where “variation” in professional thought can be appropriately 
“checked,” not a future where important professional decisions are made 
uniformly by centralized algorithms (p. 24).11  His preference is in part 
informed by equitable considerations, and it seeks to avoid a world where 
human professionals are reserved for the wealthy (pp. 34, 57).12 
 
indicating they are inherently bad patients from a medical perspective.  
Nonetheless, “machine learning algorithms may conclude such patients are less 
likely to benefit from further treatment—and recommend against it.”  Id.  
10 Consider the difficulty in replicating the legal profession’s evolving consensus 
as to what a “successful” trial looks like; that definition of “success” must weigh 
the competing requirements of the Sixth Amendment, which “lays out labor-
intensive conditions for a fair criminal trial that also has to occur quickly.”  Calo, 
supra note 2, at 414.  
11 See also Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving 
Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1243, 1252–53 (2017) [hereinafter Fourth Law] (arguing “no respectable 
legal system” would replace the work of individual judges and clerks with a 
“voice-parsing algorithm”); Frank Pasquale & Sandeep Vaheesan, Automation of 
Labor, Labor of Automation, LPE PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/automation-of-labor-labor-of-automation/ (referring to 
“distributed, in-person, democratized expertise”). 
12 See also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 8 (2017) (“The 
privileged . . . are processed more by people, the masses by machines.”); Rory 
Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 564–65 
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Human professionals can make mistakes, of course; Pasquale 
freely admits as much (p. 5).  But his concession does not undermine the 
broader observation that the mistakes and biases associated with human 
behavior are not magically avoided by automating professional judgment 
(p. 39).  Instead, human mistakes and biases shape the algorithms intended 
to replicate professional thought.13  On this, Pasquale and I agree.14  
Underpinning Pasquale’s overarching concern is a tradeoff 
between (1) mistakes and biases attributable to human professionals 
accountable to the local community members they serve, and (2) mistakes 
and biases attributable to roboticists and computer scientists working in 
far-away places behind complicated corporate structures.  Because 
“[d]istance frustrates accountability and threatens to obscure 
responsibility in a haze of computation,” he posits that the mistakes and 
biases of faceless roboticists and computer scientists should not be favored 
over the mistakes and biases attributable to identifiable human 
professionals leveraging “local knowledge” (pp. 24–25, 213). 
B. Centralized Governmental Decision-Making Authority  
Pasquale offers his four laws as a path to a better future, one not 
overrun by centralized algorithmic decision-making.  His laws, however, 
are not self-actualizing.  To be sure, he expects organized professional 
associations to achieve much of his vision by voluntarily incorporating his 
laws into new professional norms (pp. 34, 177).  But private ordering will 
quickly come up against the very economic pressures Pasquale outlines at 
the start of his analysis.15   
Those professional associations that adopt Pasquale’s laws will 
increase their members’ labor costs, at least when measured against 
robotic substitutes (p. 170).  Given as much, there is likely to be some 
hesitation to adopt newly crafted professional norms when there is no legal 
obligation to do so, and when one’s competitors may not.16  In light of 
these economic considerations, Pasquale implicitly acknowledges that, for 
 
(2016) (“When a consumer reaches out about a dispute, computer algorithms . . . 
estimate two main variables: behavior and net worth. . . . [That estimation] 
predicts the likely response for that particular consumer . . . .”).  
13 Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1924 (“Data are always socially shaped.”).  
14 See Note, Chad Squitieri, Confronting Big Data: Applying the Confrontation 
Clause to Government Data Collection, 101 VA. L. REV. 2011, 2031 (2015) 
(“Different professions operate under different premises as to what counts as data, 
and how data should be treated and relied on.”). 
15 See supra Part I.A. 
16 Pasquale describes the incentives facing individual firms as something of a 
market failure, where “[i]ndividual market transactions are not . . . conducive to a 
broader social good” (p. 175). 
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his laws to have any real effect, they must become actual laws (i.e., 
government mandates).  Indeed, Pasquale is clear in arguing that, by 
regulating artificially intelligent technologies, “the state” can “better 
protect the rights and prerogatives of workers” (p. 172).  But as is central 
to this Review, Pasquale is less clear as to which portions of “[t]he state” 
he is referring.   
In the United States, state power (i.e., governmental power) is split 
between the federal government and state governments.  State 
governments are in turn made up of political subcomponents exercising 
various degrees of autonomy.17  Pasquale is of course familiar with this 
concept of federalism.  Indeed, he notes the relationship between 
federalism and “subsidiarity,” the latter of which “commends a devolution 
of responsibility to the most local entity capable of handling it well” (p. 
176).18  His book’s single reference to federalism, however, is only offered 
as something of an analogy from which lessons for the workplace can be 
derived.  To wit, Pasquale draws on the concept of federalism to argue that 
“[m]aintaining human control over AI systems represents another form of 
subsidiarity, more functional than territorial” (id.).  He analogizes to 
federalism to argue for “democracy in the workplace,” “local governance 
by . . . professionals,” and “democratically governed communities of 
expertise” (i.e., professional associations), but never explains why 
federalism makes for good government in the first place (pp. 176, 187, 
197). 
Federalism produces two positive goods worth mentioning here.  
First, federalism helps prevent tyranny.  “[T]he genius” of the Framers was 
to “split the atom of sovereignty” such that “citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
incursion by the other.”19  Because state governments and the federal 
government exercise different authorities, no single government can wield 
absolute power.  Federalism thus protects individual liberties in a way 
similar to the separation of federal powers.20  As James Madison put it, 
 
17 It is frequently worthwhile to distinguish between local and state governments.  
See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the Problem 
of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2019).  But in an effort to be succinct, this 
Review uses the terms “state” and “local” interchangeably.   
18 Pasquale also includes “sweeping preemption” within what he refers to as the 
“Four Horsemen of Irresponsibility” (p. 40).  This reference to preemption, 
however, does not distinguish between federal and state power.  Instead, the 
reference addresses a concern that some regulatory proposals for AI would 
“diminish the role of courts in the AI field, preempting their traditional role in 
assigning blame for negligent conduct” (id.) (emphases added). 
19 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  
20 Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional 
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federalism and the separation of powers offer the people “a double 
security.”21 
In addition to helping prevent tyranny, federalism helps promote 
competition between governments, which can produce better policies.  
Unlike a centralized government, where decisions to implement AI may 
be made uniformly, federalism permits different states to take different 
approaches.  As Justice Brandeis famously explained: “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”22   
Both the prevention of tyranny and the promotion of competition 
suggest that state governments should play a key role in any effort to 
enforce Pasquale’s four laws.  As to the prevention of tyranny, developing 
labor law was a responsibility historically reserved for state 
governments—although that responsibility was altered in the wake of the 
New Deal, when the federal government came to play a larger role in 
regulating workplaces.23  That altering of the traditional balance between 
federal and state power was supported by a broader interpretation of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce.24  For some, the growing 
prevalence of AI may signal a need for an even stronger federal role.  
Placing AI in historical context counsels against such an approach. 
As Pasquale has elsewhere argued, AI represents only an 
“evolution, not revolution” in technology.25  “In many cases, AI is little 
more than a better-marketed form of statistics,” a method of analysis long 
utilized by professionals.26  Those professionals, still today, remain closely 
regulated by state governments.27  As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
the “State[s] bear[] a special responsibility for maintaining standards 
among members of the licensed professions.”28 
Should AI be used as a rationale for the federal government to 
play a new, outsized role in overseeing the professions, policymakers may 
 
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2008). 
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
22 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
23 Paul R. Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. 
L. REV. 959, 959–62 (1954). 
24 Id. at 961 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). 
25 Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1919.  
26 Id. at 1922. 
27 Some argue that state professional regulations have become too prevalent, 
creating a need for federal action.  See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels 
by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096, 1156 (2014).  
28 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). 
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unknowingly usher in something of a Trojan Horse.  As AI becomes a 
regular feature in the modern workplace, a federal government with 
outsized enforcement responsibilities would be able to assert itself more 
aggressively in professional decision-making.  And permitting federal 
technocrats to more aggressively insert themselves between professionals 
and their clients would seem to upset the very balance between 
technocracy and popular rule that Pasquale identifies as a benefit of 
professionalism (p. 4).  To prevent that sort of unchecked federal 
“incursion”29 into the arena of professional relationships, state 
governments should play a leading role in any regulatory regime 
addressing AI in the workplace.   
As to promoting competition, introducing AI into the workplace 
presents a moment ripe for state experimentation.  There is little reason to 
dictate the precise forms nascent technologies might evolve into when 
different states can instead experiment with different regulatory regimes.30  
If a uniform regulatory regime were to be selected, it should only be 
selected after a period of percolation, during which time states’ relative 
successes can be comparatively examined.31  Even if some states initially 
choose “wrong” regulatory regimes, this would not merit premature 
intervention by the federal government, which is at least just as likely to 
choose “wrong” in the first instance. 
States that initially choose “wrong” regulatory regimes are free to 
change course after observing the relative successes enjoyed by states 
utilizing different regimes.  This point is not novel; the law has long 
promoted regional variety in regulating professionals, even when it means 
some localities may initially choose the “wrong” paths.  The locality rule 
in tort law, for example, requires physicians to provide patients the degree 
 
29 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995). 
30 See Adam Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: 
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation, 21 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8 (2015) (referring to “permissionless innovation”); Andrea 
O’Sullivan, Don’t Let Regulators Ruin AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/10/24/3937/dont-let-regulators-ruin-
ai/ (same); but see ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL 
COMPETITION 224 (2016) (“Intervention should not be categorically set aside . . . 
.”).   
31 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism 
and the Railroad Problem, 92 YALE L.J. 1017, 1034 (1988) (noting that 
“extraordinary successful” state railroad regulations existed for “nearly a century” 
before “federal policymakers” decided regulation was appropriate); Thierer, 
supra note 30, at 9 (arguing for a “bottom-up” approach to “not preemptively 
suffocate technological experimentation and innovation”). 
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of skill that a reasonable physician in the same locality would provide.32   
Throughout the book, Pasquale is (understandably) more focused 
on the substance of his four laws than he is the procedure of how those 
four laws might be enforced.  When he does mention enforcement, he 
suggests a federal-centric approach.  “Because legislators cannot possibly 
anticipate every situation that authorities may need to address,” he argues, 
the “[n]ew laws of robotics should be . . . [enforced by] dedicated 
regulators” that can “solicit expert advice” (pp. 3, 41).  This reference to 
“regulators” is left undefined, and thus could be a reference to state 
regulators.  But the benefits offered by state governments justify more than 
a potential reference.  Moreover, Pasquale’s warning to avoid 
“kneecap[ing] federal regulatory agencies” suggests that he has federal 
regulators in mind (p. 40).  Indeed, he specifically calls for “independent 
. . . regulatory bodies,” (p. 131), and has elsewhere proposed that his four 
laws be enforced by “independent agencies” like those created in “the New 
Deal.”33 
To be sure, Pasquale would carve out some role for “local entities 
. . . to develop their own standards” (p. 41).  But even if that is a reference 
to local governments, rather than local professional associations, the 
envisioned role is marginal at best.  State governments can do more than 
offer “granular” changes to regulations that are otherwise “harmonized 
internationally or for a nation” (id.).   
My critique of Pasquale’s relative silence as to who should 
enforce his four laws constitutes more than an idiosyncratic reader’s 
request for additional information.  I readily acknowledge that there is only 
so much one author (at least one human author) can fit in a single book.  
Pasquale cannot be expected to explain every nook and cranny of his 
proposal.  But the proper division of governmental power is a core 
consideration in evaluating the correctness of the book’s overall 
proposal.34 Because Pasquale so masterfully highlights the benefits of 
promoting subsidiarity when it comes to professional decision-making, he 
prepares readers to expect a similarly commanding analysis of the benefits 
of promoting federalism when it comes to governmental decision-making.  
His relative silence as to enforcement and federalism is therefore notable.   
Throughout the book, there are instances when offering more 
detail about enforcement would have resulted in a more complete 
 
32 Marc Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives!  Why?  Using Modern Medicine to 
Eradicate an “Unhealthy” Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 323 (2013) (citing Kaiser 
v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965)).  
33 Been, supra note 6.  
34 See Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 1070 (“An important part of any theory of 
regulation is the identification of the optimal regulatory sovereign.”).  
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argument.  Consider again Pasquale’s suggestion that, for an occupation 
to be worth preserving for human labor, the occupation must be a 
“fulfilling vocation[]” (p. 4).  It is crucial for local government officials to 
play a role in making that determination, or at least just as crucial as the 
need (which Pasquale identifies) for professionals to play a role in defining 
successes and failures within their own professions (p. 28).   
A federal regulator in Washington, D.C. might determine that a 
West Virginia coal miner and a Massachusetts fisherman perform 
“dangerous or degrading” work unfit for humans (p. 4).  But local 
government officials, by comparison, may readily recognize that certain 
miners and fishermen find significant fulfillment in their jobs.  Perhaps 
they find fulfillment in performing work that connects them to family 
members from past generations, or work connecting them to a prized 
natural resource unique to their home state.  This is not to say that every 
miner and fisherman enjoys such fulfillment; it is unlikely that such a 
blanket statement could be made about any occupation.  But it is to say 
that determining which occupations qualify as being worth preserving for 
human labor is a determination that would benefit from input by local 
officials.  
 Pasquale’s relative silence on enforcement and federalism is also 
notable because the technological advances encouraging a centralization 
of professional judgment are some of the same advances encouraging a 
centralization of governmental power.  Consider the driverless car.  
Traditionally, automobile speeds have been established by state and local 
governments targeting human drivers.35  In setting speed limits, local 
officials could consider a wide set of factors, including safety, the needs 
of industry, and urban planning goals.  A key route connecting two 
markets, for example, might be assigned a relatively high speed limit in 
order to facilitate trade—save for a few miles where officials determine 
that speeds should be reduced so as to limit unwelcome noise, or where 
slower speeds might encourage patronage at local establishments.   
Locally established speed limits may be eliminated, however, 
when a national set of regulations targeting driving technologies can 
replace localized sets of regulations targeting human drivers.  Technology 
empowering driverless cars, after all, could be programmed with 
nationwide maps pre-set with speed limits designed to achieve national 
prerogatives.  Sure, driverless cars could be programmed to respect locally 
set speed limits to the extent that federal law does not preempt them.  But 
once it is determined that speed limits are a proper federal concern, is there 
any doubt that local speed limits will be preempted?   
 
35 See Frederick K. Beutel, Law Making by Professional and Trade Associations, 
34 NEB. L. REV. 431, 432 (1955).  
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How much influence, for example, would local home and business 
owners in Topeka, Kansas have in shaping national speed limit legislation 
identifying Topeka (and dozens of other towns) as existing along a key 
trade route between New York and Los Angeles?  Would those local home 
and business owners have more or less influence than they would if their 
speed limits were set by local officials who drive on the very roads they 
regulate?  One need not be an expert in Topeka politics to have informed 
answers to those questions.  
Driverless cars offer just one example of a broader trend.  Similar 
mismatches between local interests and national decision-making can arise 
in other contexts.  Do we need doctors in Appalachia when it may be more 
efficient for a robot to collect medical information from a patient, send the 
information to Boston to be analyzed on cutting-edge equipment, and have 
a diagnosis delivered back to Appalachia?  As “smart contracts” 
proliferate with the promise of automatically enforceable agreements 
based on software programmed in San Francisco, do we really need judges 
and lawyers in Reno?  And what happens to state licensing associations 
(and the state tort law they help create) when it becomes possible to 
regulate legal and medical technologies on a national level, rather than 
regulate human lawyers and doctors on a regional basis? 
These hypotheticals present complex questions requiring complex 
answers.  In one sense, individuals in Appalachia or Reno might prefer to 
have their medical information analyzed and contracts drafted by 
advanced algorithms designed and controlled elsewhere.  On the other 
hand, the widespread adoption of those preferences reduces the ability for 
doctors and lawyers to make a living in Appalachia and Reno, where those 
professionals might have otherwise provided personalized services 
difficult to replicate by machine.   
There is something to be said about receiving diagnostic 
information from a human capable of expressing empathy in person, or 
having a will drafted by a neighbor who personally understands the 
subjective value assigned to each heirloom.  Pasquale agrees that those 
types of values are worth preserving (pp. 25, 33, 65), but he does not argue 
for the type of federalist regulatory structure that can ensure that those 
values are preserved.36  State and local governments can play a critical role 
in ensuring that values associated with human professionalism are 
 
36 The need to affirmatively develop a federalist regulatory structure is highlighted 
by recent history in the data privacy space.  In that space, a single federal 
agency—the Federal Trade Commission—“has become the broadest and most 
influential regulatory force . . . in the United States—more so than nearly any 
privacy statute or common law tort.”  Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The 
FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86 
(2014). 
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protected, but that role is at risk of extinction if the wisdom of our 
federalist system is not carried forward into the algorithmic age.  
II. FOUR LAWS 
The remainder of this Review examines each of Pasquale’s four 
laws in greater detail.  In doing so, I offer recommendations as to how each 
law could be enforced so as to best account for the benefits of federalism.  
My recommendations are not incompatible with Pasquale’s thesis.  To the 
contrary, it is my hope that Pasquale and others will utilize these 
recommendations to expand upon the arguments offered in New Laws of 
Robotics. 
A. Complement Not Replace 
Pasquale’s first law provides that robotic systems and AI should 
complement professionals, not replace them (p. 3).  “While economic 
imperatives will pressure” employers “to substitute software” for humans, 
“professional associations should ensure that cost considerations are 
balanced against the many virtues of direct human involvement” (pp. 33–
34).  Pasquale argues that striking the right balance requires determining 
how to utilize both AI and “intelligence augmentation,” or IA; IA 
describes the use of technologies (such as information sensors) to better 
inform human decisions (p. 13).  
Technologists have long aspired to create “[s]trong” or 
“[g]eneral” AI “with abilities that meet or surpass human-level 
cognition.”37  But current AI excels only “in narrow, limited settings . . . 
where there are clear right or wrong answers.”38  Because humans and 
robots have different strengths and weaknesses, Pasquale contends that 
“[j]oint working” (i.e., work involving both AI and a human professional) 
can be “more valuable than either working alone” (p. 37). 
Pasquale’s “joint working” proposal can be naturally extended to 
inform who should enforce his first law.  Like humans and robots, the 
federal and state governments have different strengths and weaknesses. 
While the federal government is well-positioned to establish uniform (if 
generalized) standards, state governments are better positioned to leverage 
localized knowledge to develop standards tailored to local circumstances.  
Different professionals in different locations can appropriately use new 
 
37 Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1305, 1308–09 (2019). 
38 Id. at 1309.  Pasquale highlights this point with a medical example: “Narrow 
AI for detecting polyps . . . might ‘see’ a problem polyp that no gastroenterologist 
would, but it might also be incapable of recognizing other abnormalities that it 
was not trained to detect” (p. 37). 
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technologies in different ways.  There need not be a rigid national standard 
governing how professionals will incorporate new technologies into varied 
workplaces.  Instead, state officials, who already have a “special 
responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed 
professions,”39 should continue to play a “special” role in enforcing 
Pasquale’s first law.  To understand how, consider an example Pasquale 
offers concerning clinical decision support software, or “CDSS” (id.). 
By monitoring patient conditions and prescriptions, CDSS can 
alert physicians to potentially problematic combinations (id.).  “Ongoing 
regulation will be critical,” Pasquale argues, “to assure that patients will 
have the benefits of [this] cutting-edge technology, without burdening 
doctors and nurses” (id.).  The “ideal” situation would be one where CDSS 
is “neither overbearing nor merely a quiescent watcher of practitioners” 
(id.).  CDSS should therefore be “continually calibrated,” he proposes, so 
that “physicians, nurses, and pharmacists actually welcome its use, and 
have ongoing opportunities to critique and improve it” (p. 38).   
Pasquale smartly proposes that individual physicians, nurses, and 
pharmacists play a continual role in shaping software—those professionals 
have the on-the-ground expertise needed to ensure that software remains 
useful (id.).  But he does not offer insight as to who should promulgate the 
“[o]ngoing regulation” that is “critical” to ensuring that those 
professionals play a continuous role in shaping CDSS (p. 37).  Regularly 
taking physicians, nurses, and pharmacists from their work to update 
software is bound to be costly for hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies; 
governmental incentives may be necessary.  State governments, which are 
already familiar with the peculiarities of the professionals they supervise, 
are best positioned to create those incentives.  Indeed, state governments 
can engage in the “sector by sector” approach Pasquale deems necessary 
for striking the best balances between human and machine (p. 14).  The 
federal government, by comparison, is more prone to offer the “one-size-
fits-all model of technological advance” that Pasquale correctly dismisses 
(id.).    
In short, there is little need to reinvent the wheel to enforce 
Pasquale’s first law.  States already play a special role in overseeing 
professional associations, which in turn influence how professionals 
utilize all sorts of technologies.  There may be a role for the federal 
government to play when national interests are at stake and one of the 
federal government’s enumerated powers is applicable.  But the mere fact 
that artificially intelligent software is involved does not mean that the 
federal government’s regulatory role should be all-encompassing.  A 
contrary position would risk, to paraphrase a popular phrase, allowing the 
 
39 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). 
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regulation of software to eat federalism.40 
B. Counterfeiting Humanity 
Pasquale’s second law provides that robotic systems and AI 
should not counterfeit humanity (p. 7).  “As engineers scramble to fine-
tune [technologies] . . . creating pictures of ‘fake people,’ and convincing 
synthetic voices,” Pasquale asks: “Do we want to live in a world where 
human beings do not know whether they are dealing with a fellow human 
or a machine?” (id.).  He answers that question with a straightforward no, 
which he defends with two justifications.   
First, the “transition” to a “world of robots indistinguishable from 
humans . . . entails massive surveillance of humans” (p. 8).  Second, “[t]he 
voice or face of another human being demands respect and concern,” while 
“machines have no such claim on our conscience” (id.).  Thus, to avoid 
massive surveillance and an improper anthropomorphization of machines, 
Pasquale’s second law would maintain a distinction between humans and 
robots.  In doing so, his second law promotes values advanced by his 
fourth law (discussed below) by ensuring that humans are not lulled into 
assigning rights (e.g., free expression) and responsibilities (e.g., tort 
liability) to robots.41  
State-sanctioned professional associations have long prohibited 
their members from engaging in acts of deception, a category of behavior 
that would seem to comfortably cover Pasquale’s conception of human 
counterfeiting.  Legal professional rules, for example, prohibit solo 
practitioners from implying that they are part of a law partnership.42  One 
can imagine an analogous rule prohibiting a robot from deceptively 
suggesting that it is human.   
As with enforcing Pasquale’s first law, then, there is little need to 
reinvent the wheel when it comes to enforcing his second law.  As new 
and existing categories of professionals begin to incorporate AI into their 
work, state-sanctioned professional associations can establish industry and 
state specific rules to ensure that professionals do not engage in deceptive 
 
40 C.f. Marc Andreesen, Why Software Is Eating The World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512 
250915629460 (referring to the “phenomenon of software eating a traditional 
business”).    
41 Infra Part II.D; see also Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1918 (discussing “AI 
‘personhood’”).  
42 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 7.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001) (“Lawyers 
may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only 
when that is the fact.”); see also Kathryn A. Thompson, Naming Rights and 
Wrongs, ABA J. (Dec. 4, 2004), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/naming_rights_and_wrongs.  
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forms of human counterfeiting.   
As already described, professional rules can increase the cost of 
providing professional services.43  It is therefore critical that different 
states and different professions have the flexibility to focus on some rules 
rather than others.  State X, when regulating Profession X, may deem it 
imprudent to expend regulatory resources and raise the cost of professional 
services in order to target a type of behavior that is only problematic in 
Profession Y or State Y.  State-sanctioned professional associations are 
best positioned to establish the basket of rules best designed to balance the 
costs and benefits of embracing a particular technology.  Federally 
established professional rules, by comparison, are less able to adjust for 
such professional or geographic differences. 
This is not to say that federal standards should be shunned 
entirely.  Legal professional rules—which include model national rules 
and state-specific alterations—again offer an example framework.  An 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) model professional rule prohibits 
lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or 
misrepresentation.”44  Some state bar associations have opted to adopt the 
ABA’s model rule as written.45  Others have enacted the rule with unique 
changes.46  Additional regional variety can be found in how state bar 
associations interpret their rules when applying them to the unique facts 
and circumstances arising within their jurisdictions.47  This framework 
could be readily extended to address the types of deception targeted by 
Pasquale’s second law, which might arise differently in different 
professional contexts.   
C. Arms Races 
Pasquale’s third law provides that robotic systems and AI should 
not intensify zero-sum arms races (p. 9).  Traditionally, the judgment of 
military professionals has been relied upon (within democratic constraints) 
when military decisions are made.  But, where human decision-making 
moves too slowly and countries feel pressured to adopt the newest forms 
of automated weaponry, pushbutton wars can become a concern (p. 154).  
 
43 Supra Part I.B. 
44 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(c). 
45 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PRO. RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (22 NYCRR 
1200.3). 
46 See, e.g., OREGON RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3), (b) (clarifying “it shall 
not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to 
supervise lawful covert activity”). 
47 See David L. Hudson Jr., Split intensifies over prosecutors’ ethical disclosure 
duties, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 8:30 CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/ 
web/article/split-over-prosecutors-ethical-disclosure-duties-intensifies.  
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Such wars can result when countries program their weapons to respond to 
perceived threats, and adversarial countries program their own weapons to 
respond in kind.48  As a result, an escalating series of tits-for-tats can be 
set in motion with minimal opportunity for human involvement. 
Pasquale’s third law is a natural one for the federal government to 
enforce.  Indeed, federal enforcement would promote some of the 
fundamental principles that resulted in American federalism.  Fearful that 
European sovereigns would rip the newly-formed United States apart if 
individual states were permitted to enter into their own international 
alliances, the Framers ensured that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, 
Alliance or Confederation,”49 and that “[n]o State shall, without the 
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a 
foreign Power.”50   
As John Jay wrote, “[i]t is of high importance to the peace of 
America that she observe the laws of nations . . . [and] it appears evident 
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national 
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three 
or four distinct confederacies.”51  By adopting treaties to address 
artificially intelligent weaponry, the federal government can work to avoid 
unnecessary, automated warfare.  By comparison, states would upset 
fundamental principles of federalism should they interfere with foreign 
relations—an objectively federal prerogative. 
Pasquale’s third law, moreover, is not limited to military 
operations.  This law can also reduce the incentive for private companies 
to continually one-up each other with increasingly pervasive forms of data 
collection (pp. 143–44).52  To the extent Pasquale’s third law might be 
enforced in such a fashion, federal enforcement could promote 
fundamental conceptions of federalism.   
Federal enforcement of Pasquale’s third law can harmonize data 
collection standards across the country.  Doing so could avoid an 
alternative where states face incentives from locally headquartered 
companies to permit more profitable forms of collection in order to 
compete with competitors headquartered elsewhere.  And even if states 
wished to establish a uniform standard themselves, their agreement to do 
 
48 Frank Pasquale, ‘Machines set loose to slaughter’: the dangerous rise of 
military AI, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 
2020/oct/15/dangerous-rise-of-military-ai-drone-swarm-autonomous-weapons. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
52 See also FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY 4 (2015) (“As technology 
advances, market pressures raise the stakes of the data game.”). 
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so would require federal approval.  As the Constitution provides, “[n]o 
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State.”53  In short, the federal government is best 
positioned to enforce Pasquale’s third law, which calls for uniform 
standards across jurisdictions.  
D. The Duty to Identify 
Pasquale’s fourth and final law provides that robotic systems and 
AI must always indicate the identity of their creators, controllers, and 
owners (p. 11).54  This can help maintain legal accountability for flawed 
robotics, such as a medical app that misdiagnoses a rash (pp. 64–65). 
As Pasquale would have it, a robotic duty to identify would be a 
duty East Coast Code (i.e., statutory and regulatory law) requires to be 
enacted directly within West Coast Code (i.e., software language).55  
“Regulators will need to require responsibility-by-design,” Pasquale 
argues, and those regulators should consider “requiring certain hard-coded 
audit logs, or licensing practices that explicitly contemplate problematic 
outcomes” (p. 12).  He stresses that such regulation must come early, so 
that it can “influence systems development by foreclosing some design 
options and encouraging others” (id.). 
Pasquale’s intention to shape nascent technologies weighs heavily 
in favor of assigning enforcement responsibilities to state governments, at 
least for the moment.56  As mentioned above, one of the benefits of 
federalism is that different states can experiment with different regulatory 
regimes and learn from experience.57  As technologies develop and it 
becomes apparent which regulatory regimes work best, states can change 
course and leverage the lessons offered by other states.  The federal 
government, too, can learn from state regulatory experiments when 
creating its own regime after technology has matured.58 
If the federal government, however, were to prematurely select a 
uniform regulatory regime, technological developments may be forever 
tainted.  This may make it impossible to determine whether the “correct” 
 
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
54 See also Fourth Law, supra note 11, at 1252–53 (“[W]e may need to ensure that 
robots and algorithmic agents are traceable to and identified with their creators.”).   
55 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 53 (1999). 
56 See also Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1918 (“[D]raw red lines of 
responsibility and attribution now, while the technology is still nascent.”).  
57 Supra Part I.B. 
58 See, e.g., Note, Henry Adams, The Federalist Regulation of Privacy: The Happy 
Incidents of State Regulatory Activity and Costs of Preemptive Federal Action, 84 
MO. L. REV. 1055, 1070 (2020) (“[S]tate-level data breach notification statutes 
provided federal lawmakers useful templates . . . .”).  
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regulatory regime was chosen or whether a different regime would have 
better balanced the relative costs and benefits.  State governments, which 
are already familiar with identification regimes such as driver’s licenses 
and license plates,59 as well as professional disclosure requirements such 
as those stemming from fiduciary responsibilities,60 are best positioned to 
take the initial lead in enforcing Pasquale’s fourth law. 
CONCLUSION 
In New Laws of Robotics, Frank Pasquale proposes four laws 
designed to ensure that important societal decisions remain informed by 
human professional judgment.  In this Review I recommended how, if his 
four laws are to be enforced, they might be enforced so as to best promote 
principles of federalism.  It is my hope that Pasquale and others will 
incorporate these recommendations as they build upon his remarkable 
contribution. 
 
59 Marybeth Herald, Licensed to Speak: The Case of Vanity Plates, 72 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 595, 596 (2001). 
60 Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and 
the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1808–09 
(2005). 
